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Abstract: This paper gives a historical overview of the ways various trends in the
philosophy of science dealt with models and their relationship with the topics of
heuristics and theoretical dynamics. First of all, N. Campbell’s account of analogies as
components of scientific theories is presented. Next, the notion of ‘model’ in the
reconstruction of the structure of scientific theories proposed by logical empiricists is
examined. This overview finishes with M. Hesse’s attempts to develop Campbell’s early
ideas in terms of an analogical inference. The final part of the paper points to
contemporary developments on these issues which adopt a cognitivist perspective. It is
indicated how discussions in the cognitive sciences might help to flesh out some of the
insights philosophers of science had concerning the role models and analogies play in
actual scientific theorizing.
Key words: models, analogical reasoning, metaphors in science, the structure of scientific
theories, theoretical dynamics, heuristics, scientific discovery.
Hesse (1976) suggests that different philosophical explications
of the roles models play in science correspond to different models
of science. As a matter of fact, the explication of scientific modeling
became a central issue in the criticism and revision of logical
empiricism in the 50’s and the 60’s.
The critics of the logical empiricist explication of models
pointed out that it doesn’t capture one of the roles models play in
science: that of providing guidelines for the development of
theories.1
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CAMPBELL ON THEORIES
The idea that models steer the formulation and development
of theories dates back at least to Campbell’s book Physics: the
elements (1920). Strictly speaking, Campbell doesn’t talk about
“models”, but rather about “analogy”.
For Campbell, a theory is “a connected set of propositions”
that can be divided into two sets: the “hypothesis” and the
“dictionary”. The way Campbell defines these different sets of
propositions in a theory anticipates, in some respects, the so called
‘received’ (‘standard’ or ‘syntactical’) view of the structure of
scientific theories, associated with logical empiricism.2
What is relevant to my concerns here is, rather, the way in
which Campbell’s conception of a theory differs from those that
were subsequently proposed by the logical empiricists. He argues
for the need of a third component in a theory – the “analogy” –
which steers its “development”.
Campbell (1920, p. 129) explicitly distinguishes his position
from those that regard analogies simply as “aids in the formulation
of a theory”, as if they could be “removed and forgotten” once the
theory is constructed. Instead, he claims that analogies are “an
utterly essential part of theories, without which [they] would be
completely valueless and unworthy of the name”.
The bottom line of Campbell’s argument is that the
“meaning” of a proposition includes not only its empirical content,
but also the “ideas which are called to mind when it is asserted”
(Campbell, 1920, p. 132). In particular, the meaning of a theory is
not reducible to the “experimental statements” it implies. A
“valuable” theory “evokes ideas which are not contained in the
laws which it explains” (p. 132). These ideas are suggested by the
analogy and play an essential role in modifications of the
“hypothesis” and the “dictionary”, required when a theory faces
“evidence against” it (p. 134).
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In his reconstruction of the way the kinetic theory of gases
has been constructed, Campbell claims that the propositions of
the hypothesis have a similarity in form with “the laws which would
describe the motion of a large number of infinitely small and highly
elastic bodies” in a box. The propositions of the dictionary are then
“suggested by the analogy displayed by the propositions of the
hypothesis” (p. 128).
Campbell’s analogy has more than a formal dimension,
though. In this context, it is important to mention his distinction
between laws and theories, as well as the related distinction between
what a proposition “asserts” and what it “means”. A proposition
asserts its empirical content. The meaning of a proposition includes
not only its empirical content, but also the “ideas which are called
to mind when it is asserted” (p. 132).
Campbell claims that a law means what it asserts. The
meaning of a theory, however, should be distinguished from what
it asserts: its meaning is not reducible to the (meanings of the)
experimental statements it implies.
Even in the “imaginary” situation in which a theory might
be shown to be logically equivalent to a set of laws, Campbell argues
that the meaning of the theory is still not reducible to what these
laws assert. Therefore, “formal relationships” are not all that matters
in an analogy, but rather the “meanings” it conveys:
A theory is valuable, and is a theory in any sense important
for science, only if it evokes ideas which are not contained in
the laws which it explains. The evocation of these ideas is
even more valuable than the logical equivalence to the laws.
(CAMPBELL, 1920, p. 132)
Campbell argues forcefully against a formalist view of the
structure of scientific theories:
In theories [...] there is something over and above the formal
constitution, which cannot be expressed as part of the formal
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constitution and yet distinguishes the theory from all possible
alternatives. (CAMPBELL, 1920, p. 144).
If this is so, even theories that are known to be false- that is,
theories which don’t strictly imply (or are not equivalent to)
experimental laws- might still be valuable, because of the “ideas
that they bring to mind” (p. 132).3 The situation is clearly different
in the case of laws: if what we guessed to be the statement of a law
turns out to be false, there is no value left in asserting it.
Analogies and the dynamics of theories
The core of a theory is, for Campbell, its hypothesis and the
analogy it evokes, so to speak. He claims that the dictionary only
“uses the analogy” and its propositions are usually suggested by it.
Therefore, changes in the dictionary cannot be taken, strictly, as
changes in the theory – they don’t affect its “identity”.
However, changes in the hypothesis- in order to account for
inconsistencies between the implications of the theory and laws
which are already known- can be taken as changes in the essence
(or the core) of the theory and, therefore, be regarded as “evidence
against” the latter, since they show “that the original theory was
not quite complete and satisfactory” (CAMPBELL, 1920, p. 134). Given
the importance Campbell attributes to the analogy in his account
of theories, he regards this appraisal as not always accurate, since
the hypothesis might also be suggested by the analogy. In this case,
new ideas are, as it were, potentially contained in the original form
of the theory, keeping its identity.
In his reconstruction of the development of the kinetic theory
of gases, Campbell shows, for instance, how the idea that molecules
have a non-zero diameter was introduced in the hypothesis in order
to account for experimental data about the viscosity of gases. He
argues that this modification of the hypothesis was a “natural
extension of the old theory” of perfect gases, since the analogy with
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elastic bodies suggested that molecules might have a non-vanishing
size (CAMPBELL, 1920, p. 134-135). The modifications that were made
in the hypothesis can, therefore, be regarded as confirmations of
the (original) theory and not evidence against it.
Campbell has nothing to say, however, about how the scientist
comes up with the analogy in the first place. He claims that, in
most cases, it is just a lucky guess, “a brilliant idea of the inventor,
dictated by no rule” (p. 143).
I’ll show that Campbell’s idea of an analogy, as a component
of scientific theories, had its revival in the 50’s as part of the
emerging criticism against logical empiricism. Before that, we shoud
have a look at the reconstruction of scientific theories proposed by
the latter trend in the philosophy of science.
MODELS AND THE RECEIVED VIEW OF THEORIES
A central philosophical problem for the so-called “received
view” (RV) of the structure of scientific theories concerned the
meaning of the theoretical language. Logical empiricists
acknowledged that theoretical language cannot, in general, get its
meaning by explicit semantic connections with observational
language. In later versions of this view of theories, most theoretical
terms get their meaning implicitly through their relationships, in
the calculus, to other terms, mostly elementary or observational.
Only the latter are explicitly interpreted by means of correspondence
rules.
It is not straightforward to assess the place the notion of
“model” had in RV. Logical empiricists borrowed this notion from
the study of the semantics of formal languages and applied it to the
reconstruction of scientific theories. A “semantic model” is a
structure of objects, properties and relations, that satisfy (or realize)
the sentences of a calculus.
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Carnap on scientific models
As early as in Carnap’s The logical syntax of language (1937)
“model” is employed in this sense.4 We find in his works explicit
critiques of other roles models are supposed to play in science,
associated with aims like “understanding” and “visualization” (of
theories). Furthermore, I coudn’t find in Carnap’s early work, at
least, any explicit association between modeling and the issue of
theoretical dynamics.
In his paper for the The International Encyclopedia of Unified
Science (1939), Carnap addresses the issue of the purported
“psychological” role provided by models in the understanding of
scientific theories. He mentions the case of the relativity and
quantum theories and argues that the present situation, at least in
physics, is very different from that prevalent in the 19th century,
where “intuitive understanding” was still sought through the
building of mechanical models.
Carnap emphasizes that a model has “no more than an
aesthetic or didactic or at best a heuristic value, but is not at all
essential for a successful application of the physical theory” (CARNAP,
1939, p. 210). He claims that in order to apply a theory to nature, it
is enough to interpret just the “elementary terms” of the theory:
“the interpretation of the other terms is then indirectly determined
by the formulas of the calculus, either definitions or laws, connecting
them with the elementary terms” (p. 210).
In the introductory lectures on philosophy of science Carnap
gave in the late 40’s and in the 50’s (published in 1966), his target
is again models taken as “visual spatial structures”, as they were
understood in nineteenth-century physics (CARNAP, 1966, p. 176).
Visualizability is criticized even more explicitly than in his 1939
paper:
The ability to visualize is a psychological matter, entirely
irrelevant to physics. The construction of a physical theory is
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not limited by man’s power to visualize; in fact, modern physics
has moved steadily away from what can be directly observed
and imagined. (CARNAP, 1966, p. 172)
Carnap acknowledges, nonetheless, that visual models can
be useful since “the mind works intuitively, and it is often helpful
for a scientist to think with the aid of visual pictures” (p. 176).5
In these lectures, Carnap addresses, in passing, the issue of
the dynamics of theorizing. He says that the interpretation of a
“postulate system in physics” in terms of correspondence rules is
always “incomplete” and that new correspondence rules can be
added. This modification in the “dictionary” (Carnap uses
Campbell’s terminology) doesn’t change the “identity” of the theory
though, given by its “fundamental laws”. However, Carnap (1966,
p. 237) doesn’t tell us how these new correspondence rules are
introduced or how “radical changes” might come about, in which
the fundamental laws of the theory are themselves modified.
Carnap works out the example of the kinetic theory of gases
(like many others before and after him, including Campbell). He
describes very briefly the “model or schematic picture” of “particles
in constant agitation” and goes on saying that “when the kinetic
theory was first developed, many of the magnitudes occurring in
the laws of the theory were not known” (p. 241). However, this
model is not mentioned to account for the introduction of new
correspondence rules in the theory – which are required to link
theoretical terms and phenomena, making possible the
determination of those unknown parameters and, therefore, the
test of the theory.6
I must highlight, at this point, that Campbell was concerned,
primarily, neither with visualization nor with understanding, when
he argued for an analogy as a component of scientific theories. He
was, rather, looking for a rationale in the modifications a scientist
makes in a theory in order to cope with empirical data.
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A new concern with modeling
In the 50’s, the work of philosophers of a clear logical
empiricist allegiance- such as Hutten, Braithwaite, Brodbeck, and
Hempel- showed a greater concern with the explication of the role
models play in science, yielding improved versions of RV. Those
attempts fundamentally accepted Carnap’s explication in terms of
“semantic models”.
The most detailed and elaborate of these attempts is
Braithwaite’s. He characterizes a “model” as a system of propositions
having the same formal structure – the same calculus – as the
modeled theory.7 “Model” and “theory” have, however, different
“epistemological” statuses:
[...] in the model the logically prior premises determine the
meaning of the terms occurring in the representation in the
calculus of the conclusions; in the theory the logically posterior
consequences determine the meaning of the theoretical terms
occurring in the representation in the calculus of the premises.
(BRAITHWAITE, 1955, p. 90)
Braithwaite claims that “similarity in formal structure [...] is
all that is required of the relationship of model to theory” (p. 93).
He cautions against the risk of conflating the model and the theory
by taking the model’s reference as standing for the theory’s
reference. The interpretation through models can, at best, play a
psychological role in helping to grasp the calculus.
Despite his formalist inclinations, Braithwaite expected that
a philosophical reconstruction of scientific theories doesn’t “ossify”
them; instead, he recognized that theories are, in actual scientific
practice, dynamical entities (BAILER-JONES, 1999, p. 27).
The explication Braithwaite provided for scientific models
was not able, however, to account for any role they might play in
the dynamics of theories. He clearly doesn’t accept the criticism to
RV voiced, for example, by Hesse, herself echoing Campbell: “The
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model may be said to point towards its extension in a way which
thinking of the calculus in isolation would not do” (HESSE, 1962, p.
229).
The semantics of theories: do correspondence rules suffice?
Suppe (1977) showed that some versions of RV (that can be
found, for instance, in Hempel’s and Carnap’s later works) actually
require an independent semantic interpretation of the theoretical
language by means of “mathematical models”,8 over and above the
interpretation provided by correspondence rules.
Suppe’s claim presupposes a particular account of the notion
of “partial interpretation” of a theory, originally proposed by
Putnam (1962, p. 245): “to ‘partially interpret’ a theory is to specify
a non-empty class of intended models. If the specified class has one
member, the interpretation is complete; if more than one, properly
partial”.
An independent semantic interpretation of the theoretical
language is required to restrict the class of possible models for the
theory (that is, the class of models compatible with the
interpretation given by the correspondence rules to low-level terms).
This independent extra-observational interpretation presupposes
a richer metalanguage: ordinary scientific language.
Part of the meaning of theoretical terms comes from this
interpretation in the richer metalanguage; the other part comes
indirectly through the correspondence rules. Suppe claims that the
meanings of terms like “electron”, “electron emission” and so forth
are, actually, provided by
extra-observational associations – for example, for electrons
there might include various features of the billiard-ball model,
various classical intuitions about macroscopic point-masses,
and so on. Such features contribute to the meaning of
theoretical terms in ordinary scientific language, and it is quite
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likely that without them little progress could be made. But
despite their legitimate place as meaning constituents of such
terms, such features need not, and usually do not, have
observable or testable consequences. (SUPPE, 1977, p. 92)
He argues that the critics of logical empiricism often
miscontrued the intention of the proponents of later versions of
RV, as if they didn’t accept any independent semantic interpretation
of the theoretical language.9 He acknowledges, however, that the
possibility of an independent semantic interpretation of the
theoretical language is not usually made explicit and, moreover,
that philosophers like Carnap and Hempel didn’t give to this issue
the importance it deserves.10
This might explain the widespread evaluation of RV as the
“conceptual vacuum account” of theories, to use Nickles’ terms. In
that usual reading, besides “neutral” observation language, in RV
no intertheoretic relations (by means of models, analogies etc.) were
allowed “to play a genuine cognitive role either in concept formation
or in hypothesis confirmation” (NICKLES, 1977, p. 572).
However, Suppe’s construal of the logical empiricists intentions
in later versions of RV contrasts sharply with Nickles’. Suppe
argues, somewhat surprisingly, that [...] the doctrine of partial
interpretation commits the final version of the Received View
(interpreted realistically) [...] to a position very similar to that
advocated by Campbell [1920], Nagel [1961] and Hesse [1965,
1966]. (SUPPE, 1977, p. 96)
However, Suppe qualifies this claim by distinguishing two kinds
of models: “mathematical”11 and “iconic”. Carnap’s and Hempel’s
versions of RV allow only an (independent) interpretation of the
theoretical language in terms of semantic models. Nagel’s, Hesse’s
and Harré’s accounts of theories require not only a semantic but
also an iconic model.
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In an iconic model, says Suppe, “a model is a model of some
thing or kind of thing, and functions as an icon of what it models-
that is, the model is structurally similar (isomorphic) to what it
models” (SUPPE, 1977, p. 97). The example he gives of an iconic
model is again the familiar billiard ball model for gases.12
Suppe argues, however, that the need for an independent
interpretation of the theoretical language is a “logical”
requirement and should be distinguished from the role iconic
models might play in theoretical dynamics. Anyway, he explicitly
denies that “mathematical” models can play the role of guidelines
for theoretical development.13 Iconic models might be heuristically
fruitful but they aren’t essential to theories, in the sense that they
aren’t required to assure their testability or their explanatory
role.14
Schaffner concurs with Suppe showing, convincingly, that
without an “antecedent theoretical meaning” a theory can’t even
be tested:
Only after theoretical terms have been given a relatively precise
meaning, by providing a list of some of the important properties
of the hypothetically proposed theoretical entities, does it
even become possible to consider relevant experiments or
observations which might test the theory. (SCHAFFNER, 1993,
p. 132-133)
However, he departs from Suppe by arguing that since models
and analogies are often the basis of this antecedent meaning, they
can’t be considered as just “heuristic at best” (SCHAFFNER, 1993, p.
132). Schaffner claims that logical empiricists were forced to
recognize that the meaning of the theoretical language can’t be
given only by correspondence rules. Instead, the “admissibility” of
those rules depends on the antecedent meaning of the theoretical
terms.
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Hempel on analogies
Hempel’s critiques of the first versions of RV emphasized, in
agreement with Suppe’s reading, that at least part of the meaning
of theoretical terms should rely on an antecedently understood
vocabulary.
He claims, however, that this “third component” (HEMPEL,
1977, p. 251) of a scientific theory cannot be conflated with what
he calls an “analogical model”. Hempel defines analogical models
as models based on nomic isomorphisms (HEMPEL, 1965, p. 435).15
This kind of formal analogy presupposes that the laws that
describe two systems have the same form, that is, that they are
syntactically identical. The properties of the systems and their
underlying physical mechanisms need not be the same for setting
up a formal analogy, though. Hempel gives the example of the
analogy between Ohm’s law for the flow of an electric current and
Poiseulle’s law for the flow of a fluid in a pipe. Hempel argues that
analogical models, in this sense, can’t play any role in providing
explanations of phenomena in a new domain.
He acknowledges, however, that nomic isomorphisms might
play a heuristic role in the context of discovery by suggesting
“extensions of the analogy on which it was originally based” (HEMPEL,
1965, p. 441). The use of mechanical models by Maxwell is given as
an example of this heuristic role.16 However, Hempel claims that,
in this case, models are not based on a formal analogy only, but are
taken as hypothetical representations of “microphysical” structures,
like in the kinetic theory of heat. These models are, by and large,
what Suppe calls “iconic models”.
Hempel discusses, in this context, Campbell’s ideas about the
structure of theories and the essential role the latter assigns to the
analogy. He reads Campbell as if the latter required that, in
microstructure theories, the laws of the microphysical structures
and processes should be “identical or syntactically isomorphic with
a set of laws governing an already well-explored field of inquiry”
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(HEMPEL, 1965, p. 442).17 Hempel goes on to argue that “Campbell
fails to establish that analogy plays an essential logic-systematic role
in scientific theorizing and theoretical explaining” (p. 445).
However, in this criticism, Hempel presupposes that
Campbell’s analogy boils down to a nomic isomorphism. Some of
Campbell’s discussions can, certainly, be seen in this light.
Nevertheless, I have emphasized that there is more to Campbell’s
notion of “analogy” than a mere formal dimension, since it is
expected to play a role in steering the development of theories.
CRITICISM OF THE LOGICAL EMPIRICIST EXPLICATION
Despite Suppe’s point that in some versions of RV, as in
Hempel’s, there is an explicit requirement of an independent
semantic interpretation of the theoretical language, the early
critiques of logical empiricism in the 50’s and 60’s hinged rather
on the relevance of models to an account of the dynamics of
theories.
Toulmin, in his 1953 book, claims that the role of models is
not only to give an interpretation of a symbolism, but also to suggest
further questions and to steer the investigation. Models (understood
as representations, icons) are, he says, “deployed”. However,
Toulmin doesn’t offer a detailed account of how this deployment is
made, or any discussion of its reliability:
[...] the process by which, as we go along, fresh aspects of the
model are exploited and fresh questions given a meaning is a
complicated one, and one which needs to be studied in detail
for each fresh branch of physical theory if the logic of that
theory is to be clearly understood. (TOULMIN, 1953, p. 37-8)
In the 60s and 70’s, we find many other philosophers
exploring the same point: Achinstein, Harre, McMullin and
Swanson, among others.
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Achinstein (1968, p. 250), for instance, claims that “models
aid in formulating, developing, and understanding theories”. He
stands against the “semantic theory”18 since it doesn’t account for
these roles. He lists, among the supporters of the latter, Braithwaite,
Nagel, Hempel, Brodbeck and Hutten.
The critiques to the “semantic explication” of “model” were
often voiced in terms of a “surplus meaning” or “surplus content”
associated with models, which introduces an assymetry in the
relationship between model and theory, contrary to the symmetry
presupposed by the ‘formal’ explication of this relationship (as in
Braithwaite’s or Hempel’s accounts). For the model to suggest
guidelines for the development of a theory it is not enough just to
share a syntactical structure with the latter. In his 1970 book, Harré
argues also forcefully that “theory construction is primarily model
building” (HARRÉ, 1970, p. 46-47).
Swanson (1966) argued also against the explication of the
relation between a model and a theory as a mathematical
isomorphism. In the same vein as Nickles, he claims that in the
latter account “models are conceptually vacuous devices”. Instead,
he claims that in science the relation between a model and a theory
is asymmetrical: a model has a “deeper structure” than the theory
it is modeling.19
Spector (1965) argues that theoretical terms must be (directly)
interpreted in terms of a model if extensions and modifications of
the theory are to be made non-arbitrarily.
He develops a criticism of the “semantical system approach”
to models, which he associates with Carnap and Braithwaite.
Spector claims that Braithwaite’s concept of model, for instance,
cannot distinguish between different roles models play in science.
These roles go from “identities of formal structure”- where there is
“no relevant connection between the domain or subject matter of
the theory and the domain of the model” – to those in which there
is a realist commitment of the physicist toward the model taken as
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a representation of the target system (even if it is an idealized
representation).
Spector claims, like Hesse (below), that modeling is based on
analogical reasoning:
If, however, the observable properties of the domain of the
theory- the designata of the observation terms- are similar to
the properties of the model represented by these same terms
when the calculus is interpreted in the domain of the model,
then the possibility arises of comparing the properties of the
model represented by the theoretical terms of the calculus
with the theoretical objects of the theory. That is we can argue
by analogy to the nature of the theoretical properties. (SPECTOR, 1965,
p. 131)
Spector asks himself whether this condition could be seen
as an “emendation” to Braithwaite’s semantic approach. He
concludes that, actually, his approach is incompatible with the
partial interpretation thesis assumed by the logical empiricist
accounts of the structure of scientific theories since to reason
analogically
from substantive similarities in the designata of terms in the
derived formulas in the model and in the theory to substantive
similarities in the theoretical (primitive) properties amounts
to a direct interpretation of the theoretical terms in the theory.
(SPECTOR, 1965, p. 139)
He mentions Campbell, Harre, Hesse and Putnam as
anticipating this conclusion.
I will examine next Hesse’s work which is, probably, the most
systematic effort to flesh out Campbell’s ideas on the role analogies
play in theoretical dynamics.
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Hesse on scientific modeling
One year before Toulmin’s 1953 book, Hesse argued that
one of the main functions of an analogy or model is to suggest
extensions of the theory by considering extensions of the
analogy, since more is known about the analogy than is known
about the subject matter of the theory itself. (HESSE, 1952, p.
291)
In a paper published two years later, she claims that the
mechanical models of 19th century physics, like Maxwell’s, played
an important role as “pointers towards future progress” (HESSE,
1954, p. 200).20
Many critics of the semantic explication of ‘model’ (especially
in Braithwaite’s version) argued that for a model to play the role of
a “pointer”, it has to share with the theory more than a common
(syntactic/formal) structure. Hesse, likewise, makes a distinction
between “formal” and “material” analogies.21 She attempts to
explicate the role of models as pointers in terms of the (classical)
analogical argument.
In a nutshell, Hesse’s fundamental thesis is that the logical
empiricist semantic explication of ‘model’ cannot provide a
rationale for modifications either in the axioms of the theory or in
the correspondence rules. She argues that only models based on
material analogies can provide this rationale and, therefore, make
a theory predictive in a strong sense.22
In Hesse’s account, material analogies presuppose a (pre-
theoretical) recognition of similarities at an observational level,
between two systems or domains: the “source” and the “target”.23
Hesse calls these similarities the “positive analogy”, using a
terminology she borrows from Keynes. Even if a source is able, by
applying this condition, to provide a model for the target, the source
and the target are supposed to differ in many respects, that is, they
have a “negative analogy” as well.24
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A model for the target system (model1) is constructed from
the representation of the source system (model2) by the elimination
(abstraction) of the recognized negative analogy.25 Billiard balls can
be a model for gases if we abstract irrelevant properties of the balls,
such as their color. The important point to emphasize here is that
the construction of models always involves abstraction.
The positive analogy prompts analogical inferences from the
description (theory or representation) of the source to a (tentative)
description of the target domain. That is, from the perception of
similarities at an observational level, we infer (analogically) that
both systems probably share other features as well, comprising their
“neutral analogy”. In non-trivial cases, the inferred features are
nonobservable in the target domain and, therefore, provide prima
facie (theoretical) explanations of the manifest behavior of the target
system.
What Hesse calls the neutral analogy has a fundamental
importance for the constructive role she assigns to scientific modeling.
Theories are, for Hesse, dynamic entities and the neutral analogy
between a (source) model and a (target) system constitutes, in her
terms, its “growing points” (HESSE, 1966, p. 10; 2000, p. 299-300).26
AN ANALYSIS OF HESSE’S APPROACH TO SCIENTIFIC MODELING
Several problems are generated by Hesse’s analogical
inference approach to the role of models as guidelines for theoretical
construction. This might explain why it remained relatively marginal
from mainstream philosophy of science. Nevertheless, Hesse’s ideas
have resurfaced in the recent interest in analogical reasoning in AI
and CS (ABRANTES, 1999). In the following, I will, first of all, highlight
some problems suggested by her early account and then indicate
how they can be worked out by adopting a new approach.
Should observations play a special role in looking for a potential
analogy?
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Some argument has to be provided for the privilege conceded
to observations (or, rather, descriptions using observational terms)
in assessing the similarity of the source and the target systems. Hesse
insists, in her 1966 book, that similarities should be figured out
“pre-theoretically” since to construct a theory for the target domain
is what analogical modeling is all about. Obviously, similarity
assessments should not presuppose this theory. But this is not the
same as to reject any theoretical bias at all.
The privilege conceded to observations in providing a
semantics for scientific theories can be seen as a reminiscence of
the logical empiricist strict separation between the theoretical and
the observational. From this point of view, meaning should
ultimately rest on observational language since the latter is taken
to be antecedently understood.
Spector argues that if we “impute observational properties
to unobservable objects” by means of analogical reasoning, we
cannot anymore accept one of the basic presuppositions of the
“semantical system approach”, that is, a strict distinction between
an observational and a theoretical language (SPECTOR, 1965 p. 139).
The claim that analogical arguments are at the basis of
concept formation and meaning ultimately undermines a strict
distinction between the observational and the theoretical languages.
Through analogical reasoning, a predicate that describes an
observed property in the source domain may be (hypothetically)
applied to non-observed/able properties in the target domain.27 If
the constructed target theory is successful, the application of this
predicate to non-observed/able entities becomes entrenched and
can be, tentatively, further applied to other analogous systems.28
A more useful distinction can be made, therefore, between
entrenched and non-entrenched predicates. Entrenched predicates
are “familiar” in the sense that they have been successfully applied
to different kinds of systems in the past, and figure in accepted
theories. That is, entrenched predicates are those employed in the
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“ordinary” scientific lexicon (which is usually far removed from the
language of “ordinary” experience).
Therefore, the distinction between “observable” and
“theoretical” terms should not be regarded as absolute. The dividing
line can shift from time to time and from science to science. Mellor,
writing roughly at the same time as Hesse, highlights that the border
line between the observational and the theoretical is always relative
to a particular domain of application and to a particular stage of
scientific development:
To be an observable in a science is to be referred to by a term
so enmeshed in that science’s law network that its correct
application to relevant experience (controlled observation) is
taken to be unproblematic, direct, not involving interpretation
by assuming any particular structure of relations between it
and other such terms. (MELLOR, 1968, p. 288)
A theoretical term, instead, is a term introduced by a new
theory and depends on this particular theory to be applicable to
experience. However, those theoretical terms can later become
entrenched: “terms introduced by a successful theory become part
of that science’s observation language” (MELLOR, 1968, p. 288).
Metaphors in science29
If this is so, there can’t be a strict separation either between
the observational and the theoretical languages, or between ‘literal’
and ‘metaphorical’ applications of a term, a point acknowledged
by Hesse herself: “What is important, is not to try to draw a line
between the metaphoric and the literal, but rather to trace out the
various mechanisms of meaning-shift and their interactions” (HESSE,
1966, p. 166; 1976, p. 8).30
Already in her 1966 book, Hesse criticized the deductive-
nomological account of explanation and argued for a view of
explanation as a metaphorical redescription of the domain of the
Paulo Abrantes
244 PHILÓSOPHOS 9 (2) : 225-269, jul./dez. 2004
explanandum. In her proposal, to explain is to redescribe the
explanandum using the language of the explanans what leads to a
shift in the meaning of the terms originally used to describe the
domain of the explanandum.31
From a realist point of view, metaphor has the function of
catachresis, as already pointed out by Boyd (1979). The theoretical
vocabulary in scientific theories refers to things and properties that
are beyond our ordinary experience. So, an ostention theory of
meaning – which considers that all meaning is based on experience
– cannot account for the role scientific theories play in refering to
those things.
Martin & Harré make also this point, associating it with
modeling:
It is the role of catachresis which is, in an indirect way, the
reason why metaphor is so very useful in scientific theory-
making, for, as suggested earlier, it is not the model in itself as
heuristic device that makes models indispensable in creative
theory-making, but the fact that the model gives rise to, ‘spins
off’ a matrix of terminology which can then be used by the
theorist as a probative tool. Speaking metaphorically on the
basis of a model, a scientist is enabled not only to posit but
to refer to theoretical entities by the use of terms which
transcend experience in that their semantic context is not
fully determined a priori by the empirical conditions for their
application. Meaning is not exhausted by the conditions of
assertability. (MARTIN & HARRÉ, 1982, p. 101-102).32
The large litterature on metaphors provides clues to work
out, for instance, some of the insights we find in Campbell, especially
on the way analogies provide meaning to scientific theories.
Similarity and relevance
A central problem for any account of analogical reasoning
concerns the notion of “similarity”. Any two systems can be
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perceived as “similar” in an indefinite number of respects and in
various degrees.33 Granting, for the moment, that we have selected
a source analog, we need to distinguish those respects (e.g. properties)
that are relevant from those that aren’t, in mapping it to the target.
This is certainly a precondition for the plausible transfer of concepts
from this particular source representation to the target.
Hesse was aware of the need for criteria in deciding what the
relevant respects are in mapping the source to the target. I will, for
the sake of argument, grant Hesse’s (problematic) requirement that
the positive analogy should be established solely on the basis of
observation. Given the positive analogy, Hesse proposes,
furthermore, that those properties in the source which are causally
related to the properties that comprise the (already recognized)
positive analogy, should also be taken as relevant in making
analogical inferences to the target. These “essential properties”
should not be dismissed (that is, they should not be included in the
negative analogy), since this would amount to the rejection of the
source as a model for the target.34
Hesse’s emphasis on causal relations has a pragmatic and an
ontological justification. If the basic aim of science is to set up (causal)
explanations for the target phenomena, then the criteria that
constrain the selection, the mapping and analogical inferences to
the target should give a prominent role to causal relations in the
source domain.35
Relevance criteria for similarity assessments are, therefore,
always relative to a context, that is, to ontological and pragmatic
commitments of the scientific community in a particular historical
period. This point is recognized, in different ways, by many
philosophers.
Kuhn (1977, p. 297-298), for instance, claims that “models
[...] are what provide the group with preferred analogies or, when
deeply held, with an ontology”. Here, the term “model” is used to
single out a broad world view. Normal science is described, in Kuhn’s
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work, as problem solving based on similarity with a set of
“exemplars”.36
Popperian philosophers conceded also a central role to
ontological commitments in their reconstruction of scientific
practice. Lakatos, particularly, was much more interested in
theoretical dynamics than logical empiricists. The development of
a scientific research program involves the construction of better
(that is, less idealized) models of the phenomena on the guidance
of the “positive heuristics” which, in Nickles’ words, “amounts to a
kind of transducer for converting metaphysical ideas into a
progressive series of scientific theories” (NICKLES, 1987b, p. 118).37
However, Kuhn and Lakatos are somewhat vague on how
ontological commitments shape heuristics and, consequently,
theoretical dynamics. McLaughlin explicitly makes the same point:
For each person, [a Scientific World View] consists of a vast
set of beliefs about the world, many of them unconscious,
un-articulated or implicit in more overt ones, which serve to
define what seems to him/her ‘natural’ as well as ‘odd’ in
his/her experience, and thence to pick out or highlight striking
or significant features of problem situations, as well as of
possible models therefor. (MCLAUGHLIN, 1982, p. 94)
In a note to this passage, McLaughlin highlights the
“affinities” between his notion of “scientific world view”, Kuhn’s
paradigms, Lakatos’ research programs and Holton’s themata.
McLaughlin could also have included in this list Harre’s “theory-
families” (Harré, 1986). Actually, since his 1970 book, Harré has
been arguing for the role ontological commitments play in scientific
modeling:
Plausibility for a model is determined partly by the slowly
changing general assumptions of the scientific community as
to what the world is really like, partly by the way the model
fits in to the particular circumstances for which it was created.
(HARRÉ, 1970, p. 50)
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The plausibility of analogical inferences
This problem is a central one in Hesse’s approach to modeling.
She acknowledges, however, that this might be as hard a problem to
solve as that of the justification of induction. Its solution is required,
though, for replying to the critique that analogical reasoning is
unreliable. Braithwaite, for instance, typically says:
Analogy can provide no more than suggestions of how the
theory might be extended; and the history of science tells us
that while some analogical suggestions have led to valuable
extensions of the theory, others have led to dead ends.
(BRAITHWAITE, 1962, p. 230)
It is not enough to reply that analogical arguments – like
inductive arguments and other kinds of plausible arguments – cannot
support logically necessary conclusions and, therefore, that these
conclusions should be vindicated a posteriori (HESSE, 1966, p. 14).
Some account has to be provided of the a priori plausibility of
analogical inferences. I’ll suggest below that this problem should
be reformulated in other terms.
ANALOGICAL REASONING AND SCIENTIFIC MODELING
Cognitive science (CS) research on analogical reasoning helps
to make explicit and to articulate many insights from philosophers
of science concerning the role played by models in the sciences.
Henceforth I will embrace an explicit naturalistic and cognitivist
approach, which is noticeable in some of my former comments.38
I will address in this final part just a few of the insights
discussed above, to give a flavor of the contributions a cognitivist
approach can give to the understanding of modeling in actual
scientific reasoning.
I have just mentioned that Hesse devoted many efforts to
tackling the problem of the validity of analogical arguments that
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supposedly underlie scientific modeling. The foregoing discussion
suggests, however, that the reasoning process involved here can’t
be explicated in terms of a simple kind of inference.39
In fact, recent work in CS analyzes analogical reasoning into
various elementary sub-processes: the selection of a source, its
representation, the mapping of the source and the target
representations and, finally, the extension or transfer of the source’s
representation to the target domain.
A main divergence between different computational
simulations of analogical reasoning concerns whether the
construction of representations for the source and the target domains
might be regarded as an integral part of this kind of reasoning or
not. For instance, Hofstadter (1995) criticizes a simulation proposed
by Gentner (1989) and shows, convincingly, that the construction of
representations cannot be separated from the mapping in analogical
reasoning. The hard problem for a theory of analogy is to give an
account of the construction of representations and the mapping as
intertwined processes.40
Artificial Intelligence (AI) implementations have shown that
the processing of information is sensitive to the way it is encoded.41
We can expect, therefore, that the transfer of information from
the source to the target be affected by the way the source and the
target are represented. The mapping is also, obviously, dependent
on these representations. CS brought to the investigation of
reasoning processes in general, and to analogical reasoning in
particular, this fundamental result: the various sub-processes of
analogical reasoning should not be regarded as autonomous, but as
interacting in complex ways.42
The claim that analogical reasoning involves a complex
reasoning process has also been made in philosophical discussions.
Leatherdale, for instance, distinguishes an analogical argument from
what he calls an “analogical act”:
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[...] it cannot be stressed enough that an analogical act is not
in any sense an argument, even though it may well provide a
basis for one. Even where it does provide the basis of an
argument, it cannot be a purely formal argument on the lines
of the logical paradigm of an argument from analogy [...]
(LEATHERDALE, 1974, p. 14-15)
Analogy-making is likened to an act of recognition, or
perception, involving “revisualization” or “re-representation”.43 In
AI, Hofstadter (1995) champions this analogy- as- perception
approach.
Ontological commitments in analogical reasoning
I highlighted previously one of the insights of many
philosophers of science that addressed scientific modeling:
ontological commitments are involved not only in selecting a
particular source analogue for modeling purposes, but also in
determining the properties that should be taken into account when
the source and the target are likened. I showed also how Hesse
faces the problem of relevance in her account of analogical
modeling.
A distinctive way to handle this issue is by adopting a top-
down approach to similarity. Instead of taking ‘similarity’ as a
primitive notion, as in a bottom-up approach, we should consider
‘similarity’ as a derivative notion and make explicit the basis of
similarity judgments. In a top-down approach, ontological
commitments indicate the relevant respects in which the source
and the target domains should be compared.
Work in AI on knowledge representation can help to make
these ideas more precise and workable. It is worth considering an
example of this kind of approach in Aranson et al. (1995).44
If we represent a particular ontology (or world-view) by a type-
hierarchy, then to select a source model amounts to making a (rough)
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hypothesis about what type of system the target is an instance of.
The source and the target are supposed to share a certain number
of properties, relations etc. corresponding to given types (of systems)
at different levels in this hierarchy. The decision to map only certain
respects of the source and the target systems, and to dismiss others,
follows from this localization of both systems in a type-hierarchy.45
Analogical reasoning can be understood, from this point of
view, as a process of representing the model and the modeled systems
as instances of the same or of similar types of system. As a result of
this re-representation, the differences between the source and the
target (Hesse’s negative analogy) are considered as non-essential or
accidental.
This process often involves the construction of more abstract
concepts through an interplay of constraints imposed by the source
and the target domains (or, better, their original representations)
as well as by the accepted ontology.
For instance, modeling sound phenomena on a description
of water waves, involves a procedure for creating a new and more
abstract concept of ‘wave’ that can be instantiated in both domains
of phenomena. We have to tell those features of both domains of
phenomena that have to be ignored from those that are relevant.
If we try to extend the analogy to include light phenomena, the
similarities between these realms of phenomena have to be figured
out by constructing an even more abstract concept of wave. This
abstraction led, historically, to sever the original concept of wave
from its connections with the notion of a material medium. The
failure to make this step prompted, initially, analogical inferences
to the existence of an electromagnetic ether (see DARDEN, 1982, p.
149).46
It can, therefore, be helpful to understand analogical
reasoning underlying modeling as higher-order categorization.47
One much discussed problem about categorization is whether it is
based on the (pre-conceptual) perception of similarities between
different objects or, rather, these similarities are perceived as a result
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of the instantiation of concepts. Categorization actually seems to
involve both top-down (that is conceptual) as well as bottom-up (that
is perceptual) contraints. Analogical reasoning is, likewise,
constrained by the accepted ontology (with its associated conceptual
schemes) and by phenomena in both domains.
Similarities between the source and the target are, therefore,
not discovered as objective relationships but are, rather, constructed
through a complex reasoning process, where the source and the
target descriptions interact in many ways.48 One of the consequences
of this interaction is a change in the meaning of (familiar) predicates
(or terms).49 Similarity assessments are not, therefore, the starting
point but, rather, the upshot of a process that can be better
described as “analogy-making” (HOFSTADTER, 1995).
CONCLUSION
The main trend in the philosophy of science in the last century
disregarded heuristics as worth investigating. “Heuristics” (as a topic
in methodology) has been associated with an essential irrationality
attributed to discovery processes and contrasted with “logics”.50 This
trend found a firm ground in a reconstructivist approach to
modeling in science (resulting, itself, in a particular “model of
science”, as Hesse suggested). Despite the many respects in which
Hesse’s and Campbell’s accounts of the dynamics of scientific
theories depart from that proposed by logical empiricists, they still
accepted this dichotomy and struggled to show that models (or
analogies) play not only a heuristic but also a logical role in
theorizing.51
Heuristics became a central concern to those working in AI.52
The current interest in analogical reasoning in this field corresponds,
however, to a shift from universally applicable, formal and context-
independent reasoning strategies, to a knowledge-driven approach,
tied to specific bodies of knowledge, influenced by the context –
the representations, the world view and the goals of the agent.
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Philosophy of science should take advantage of this trend and
approach modeling as one of the most important heuristics in
scientific activity.53
OS MODELOS E AS DINÂMICAS DAS TEORIAS
Resumo: O artigo traça um panorama histórico das várias correntes em filosofia da ciência
que lidaram com modelos e sua relação com os tópicos da heurística e da dinâmica teórica.
Em primeiro lugar, apresenta-se a proposta de N. Campbell de ver analogias como
componentes de teorias científicas. Examina-se, em seguida, a noção de “modelo” na
reconstrução da estrutura das teorias científicas propostas pelos empiristas lógicos. Esse
panorama completa-se com as tentativas de M. Hesse de desenvolver as idéias preliminares
de Campbell em termos de uma inferência analógica. A parte final do artigo aponta para
desenvolvimentos contemporâneos sobre esses tópicos que adotam uma perspectiva
cognitivista. Indica-se como as ciências cognitivas poderiam ajudar a materializar algumas
das intuições que os filósofos da ciência tiveram a respeito do papel que modelos e analogias
desempenham na teorização científica real.
Palavras-chave: Modelos, raciocínio analógico, metáforas em ciência, estrutura das teorias
científicas, dinâmica teórica, heurística, descoberta científica.
Notas
1. The term “model” is ambiguous and is used, by scientists and
philosopheres alike, with a plurarity of meanings. These
meanings correspond to a plurality of roles models are supposed
to play in scientific practice. It is not my aim, in this paper, to
give an exhaustive account of these roles but, rather, to focus
on one of them. Nonetheless, my discussion, in what follows,
will have to deal with different kinds of models, and I hope the
context will make clear what their differences are.
2. The notion of “hypothesis” corresponds roughly to a “calculus”,
and the notion of “dictionary” corresponds to a set of
“correspondence rules” or “meaning postulates”. Carnap,
himself, in his later works, acknowledges Campbell’s
contribution (CARNAP, 1966, p. 233). He doesn’t mention,
however, Campbell’s notion of “analogy”.
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3. The appraisal of the “value” of a theory can, however, vary from
individual to individual: “[...] an analogy is a function of the
contemplating mind; when we say that one set of propositions
is analogous to another we are saying something about its effect
on our minds; whether or not it produces that effect on the
minds of others, it will still have that effect on our own”
(CAMPBELL, 1920, p. 144). This claim is made in the context of
his discussion of the role simplicity plays in choosing an analogy
in the case of “mathematical theories”. Hence, there is a
personal and arbitrary feature in analogies and in our appraisal
of their value. Hempel (1965) criticizes this subjective aspect of
Campbell’s analogy.
4. In Carnap’s 1942 book we can also read: “For the application
[of calculi or postulate sets] in science it is necessary to leave the
purely formal field and construct a bridge between the postulate
set and the realm of objects. This is usually called constructing
models for the postulate set or laying down correlative definitions
for it (‘Zuordnungsdefinitionen’, Reichenbach)” (CARNAP, 1942,
p. 204).
5. We can read in another passage from these lectures: “It must
not be forgotten that, both in the history of science and in the
psychological history of a creative scientist, a theory has often
first appeared as a kind of visualization, a vision that comes as
an inspiration to a scientist long before he has discovered
correspondence rules that may help in confirming his theory”
(CARNAP, 1966, p. 245).
6. Surprisingly, when discussing the development of Maxwell’s
theory, Carnap acknowledges that “the great strength of the
new model was revealed in its power to predict, to formulate
empirical laws that had not been previously known” (CARNAP,
1966, p. 242). However, since Carnap does not specify clearly
what counts as a “theoretical model” in this context, I guess
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that, in this particular example, he is simply identifying “model”
and ‘theory’.
7. We find in empiricist philosophers an ambiguity concerning
the nature of models. Sometimes they are presented as a set of
entities (non-linguistic things or a structure, by adopting a set-
theoretic approach). Formally, given two relational systems S
and S’, defined as ordered tuples of sets of objects, properties
and relations, S is said to be “a model for S” if there is a
homomorphic mapping from the objects of S to the objects of
S’ (that is, a mapping that preserves the relations that hold in
S). Other times, models are taken to be linguistic objects (a set
of propositions). An example of this ambiguity we find in Nagel:
“Let P be a set of postulates; let P* be a set of statements obtained
by substituting for each predicate variable in P some predicate
that is significant for a given class of elements K; and finally, let
P* consist only of true statements about the elements in K. By a
model for P we understand the statements P*, or alternately
the system of elements K characterized by the properties and
relations that are designated by the predicates of P*” (NAGEL,
1961, p. 96, note). See also the distinction in Apostel (1961)
between “semantic” and “syntactic” models. Achinstein (1968)
and Mellor (1968) make the same point in distinguishing
linguistic and set-theoretic notions of “model” in mathematical
logic. Let us call these two concepts of “model” the S-view and
the L-view. In the L-view, a model is any set of propositions
(true of some set of objects) having the same formal structure-
the same calculus- as the modeled theory. “Model” and “theory”
are just different interpretations of the same calculus. Braithwaite
(1955) adopts clearly the L-view of “model”. Cf. Giere (1999).
8. Suppe says that the predicate “mathematical” used here is,
probably, misleading. The expression “mathematical models”
stands here simply for semantic models, as in model theory
(adopted by Carnap), its scope not being restricted in any way to
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mathematics (SUPPE, 1977, p. 97, note 200). The relevant
distinction for Suppe, as I will show in what follows, is between
“mathematical” and “iconic” models.
9. Suppe claims that “the prohibition on supplying [theoretical
vocabulary] terms with an independent semantic interpretation
is limited to observational interpretation and does not prohibit
supplying them with nonobservational meaning. Moreover,
Carnap and Hempel do make it clear various places that
independent nonobservational semantic interpretations are
permissible” (SUPPE, 1977, p. 90).
10. Suppe (1977, p. 90, note 191; p. 101, note 211).
11. See note 8.
12. Harré uses the same terminology: “An iconic model stands in
for the real mechanism of nature, of which we happen to be
ignorant” (HARRÉ, 1970, p. 52).
13. See Suppe (1977, p. 99, note 208). Cf. Hesse’s requirements for
strongly predictive theories (see note 22, below).
14. Suppe has been one of the proponents (with many others) of
what has been called a ‘semantic’ conception of the structure of
scientific theories, presented as an alternative to the ‘syntactical’
conception (also named the ‘standard’ or ‘received’ view of
theories-RV). This loose terminology to refer to very different
philosophical reconstructions of scientific theories brings a lot
of confusion to the debate, though. I won’t go into further
terminological clarifications, which would depart from my chief
concern here. I just mention that in the semantic conception,
the notion of ‘model’ becomes the central one and a theory is
not anymore identified with a set of sentences, as in RV. A theory
is regarded by the semantic view as a set of models. The semantic
view was developed, through many versions, during the 60’s
and is still an active philosophical program. For a historical
overview of these attempts, see Diez & Lorenzano (2002). I
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discuss the semantic view in the context of Kuhn’s work in
Abrantes (1998b, p. 86). In her 2000 paper, Hesse compares
three accounts of theories: the syntactical (or hypothetico-
deductive) account, the semantic and the analogical. She argues
for the latter one, as I will show below. See also note 18, below.
15. He mentions, in this context, Maxwell’s famous definition of
“analogy” in “On Faraday’s lines of force” (1855).
16. He is certainly referring here to Maxwell’s 1861-2 paper. Cf.
note 15. For historical case-studies on the role different kinds
of models and analogies play in science and, especially, in the
construction of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, see Abrantes
(1998a).
17. Hempel gives also the example of the kinetic theory of gases
and its “analogy” with billiard balls.
18. We have here an example of the confusing terminology used to
name different philosophical reconstructions of the structure
of scientific theories, as I mentioned in note 14. The target of
Achinstein’s critique here is clearly the notion of a “semantic
model”, itself a component of later versions of RV (that is, what
I have been calling the “syntactical view” of theories) and not
what I named, in that note, the “semantic view”.
19. More recently, Hughes (1997) proposed a triadic “denotation-
demonstration-intepretation” account of models, where the
internal dynamics of the models is captured by the
“demonstration” part of the triad. To model is to represent a
kind of system as being of another kind. Novel predictions are
made about the system under investigation by exploring the
internal dynamics of the model (which can be of different kinds:
material, analogical, mathematical etc.).
20. The main thesis of this paper, however, is that not only “physically
imaginable models” (like the forementioned mechanical models)
can serve as pointers, but also purely mathematical models:
“Theories of a purely mathematical kind may function in
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essentially the same way as physically imaginable models” (HESSE,
1954, p. 200). She claims that in contemporary physics,
mathematics is the main basis for heuristics and not, anymore,
the former kind of models. Here Hesse is clearly not using
“mathematical models” in the same sense as Suppe, above (see
note 8). Redhead (1980) and Cushing (1982) argue, more
recently, for this heuristic role played by mathematical models.
In this respect, see also Steiner (1989), Hesse (1966, p. 20, 23).
Hesse’s later work will be, however, focused on physical models
and not on mathematical models.
21. We should distinguish in this context two senses of “formal” (in
qualifying analogies and models): Braithwaite’s and Hempel’s.
We saw that Hempel claims that nomic isomorphisms can be
heuristically useful in suggesting extensions of a theory. In her
1966, Hesse talks rather about the first, Braithwaitean sense of
a common (formal) structure shared by a model and a theory.
We find also characterizations of “material” or “substantial”
analogies in Nagel (1961), Harre (1970, 1986) and Achinstein
(1968), among others. Likewise, Harré claims that “[iconic]
models are related to their subjects and to their sources by
relations of similarity and difference in material properties. They
are to be contrasted with formal or abstract models, which are
based on isomorphisms of structure. Model theory in
mathematics and the sentential models that are used in some
branches of mathematical physics are such formal models. They
have their uses too, but play little role in the organization of
the intentional objects of middle level theory-families” (HARRÉ,
1988, p. 120).
22. The distinction between strongly and weakly predictive theories
is basic to Hesse’s account. A theory is weakly predictive when it
is able to predict only new relationships between the same
observational predicates used already in the formulation of
accepted (empirical) laws. Hesse calls weakly predictive theories
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“formal theories”, referring to RV (1966, p. 38). A theory is
strongly predictive when it can predict new relationships
involving new observational predicates. This presupposes either
changes in the axioms of the theory (changes in Campbell’s
“hypothesis”) or in the correspondence rules (changes in
Campbell’s “dictionary”). Hesse claims that models based on
material analogies are necessarily constitutive of strongly
predictive theories. If a theory has no model, changes in the
axioms of the theory, or in the correspondence rules, can only
be made in an arbritrary way. We saw that Suppe distinguishes
this argument for models from the issue of the testability of
theories, used by Hesse as another argument for the “essential”
role models play in science. Suppe claims that an independent
semantic interpretation of the theoretical language can account
for testability, but not for Hesse’s “strong prediction” (see Suppe,
1977, p. 99-100, esp. note 208). Hesse argued for the idea of
‘strong prediction’ as early as in her 1954 paper (HESSE, 1954, p.
199). Cf. Braithwaite’s distinctions between kinds of ‘prediction’
(1962, p. 228-229).
23. Hesse calls this a “horizontal condition” for analogical modeling.
24. The plausibility of analogical inferences should be, somehow, a
function of the ratio of the positive and the negative analogies.
25. In a nutshell we have: Model 1 = Model 2 – (negative analogy).
26. More adequately, we should perhaps speak not of a single theory,
but of a “research program” in the sense of Lakatos, or of “theory-
families” in the sense of Harre (1986), in which the neutral
analogy provides the “positive heuristic” for constructing a series
of models, more and more realistic (that is, less and less idealized).
27. See also Putnam (1962, p. 242-243); Spector (1965).
28. See Mellor (1988, p. 288) and Hesse (1980, p. 107-108).
29. I don’t have here enough space to develop this large topic. I will
just indicate how it is related to the issue of the (fuzzy) boundaries
between the theoretical and observational languages.
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30. In her more recent work, Hesse makes explicit the implications
of this point: she acknowledges that the similarity basis of
relations between object’s properties be “either directly
perceived” or a consequence of “conceptual resemblances of ideas
or pictures derived from preconceived cultural forms” (HESSE,
1988, p. 324-325).
31. See note 40.
32. More recently, Harré keeps mentioning the relevance of Boyd’s
account of metaphorical language in science: “Metaphor is a
trope through which new vocabulary is created. By means of it
our conceptual grasp of a subject matter (referent) is enhanced
by the use of a term with a well established context of use, and
thus an existing deep grammar and set of associated
commonplaces. A term used metaphorically is a term used in a
new context to express a belief for which there is no existing
vocabulary. In using a metaphor we are not comparing the
subjects of the attribution of the term in the old and the new
contexts, that is looking for similarities and differences between
the old and the new extensions of the term. We are not
acquainted with the referent of the term in the new context.
But perhaps from theory we know some of the things we want
to say about it. We are illuminating the new subject by virtue of
the existing intension of the displaced term. In the new context
that intension will be modified through the exigencies of the
new conditions for its uses. In this way, through metaphor, new
vocabulary can be created within the existing structure of
language, so securing the intelligibility of the term in its new
context of use. Only the displacement theory of metaphor [a
term Harré borrows from Schon] could explain how the use of
terms metaphorically could open up the epistemic access which
Boyd (1979) has rightly seen to be their creative function” (HARRÉ,
1986, p. 77).
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33. See, for instance, Goodman (1976, p. 77), Black (1962), Quine
(1994).
34. Hesse highlights that there are actually two possibilities here: a)
“essential properties” are those engaged in causal relations (in
the source theory) with properties in the positive analogy, and/
or; b) essential properties are those engaged in causal relations
(in the source theory) with properties in the neutral analogy
(HESSE, 1966, p. 79, 90).
35. This second, “vertical”, requirement can be understood as a claim
that relations (and not only isolated properties) are central for
analogical reasoning. Cf. Gentner (1989) and the privilege she
also gives to relations in her simulation of analogical reasoning. I
discuss Gentner’s and other simulations in Abrantes (1999).
36. For an in depth discussion of the role Kuhn assigns to exemplars
in “normal science”, see Abrantes (1998b).
37. Lakatos (1978, p. 51) describes the positive heuristics as a
“metaphysical’ principle”. It is remarkable that the popperian
tradition, in contrast with logical empiricism, also helped to
reintroduce, in the agenda of the philosophy of science, the
topic of theoretical dynamics (through Popper’s focus on the
“growth of knowledge”).
38. This approach is salient, for instance, in some of my references
to “understanding”, “visualization” and “reasoning” in the role
played by models in scientific activity.
39. I have developped more fully this approach in other papers
(ABRANTES, 1999, 2003), where I compare several computational
simulations of analogical reasoning and used this to account for
analogical modeling in the sciences.
40. We can, retrospectively, see Hesse’s early attempt of accounting
for scientific explanation in terms of ‘metaphorical redescription’
(HESSE, 1966) as compatible with this more general account of
analogy-making. See above my discussion of the role metaphors
play in science.
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41. This point has been made by many people. See, for instance,
Gardenfors, 1990, p. 93-94. Toulmin (1953) suggested that new
forms of representation make possible new inferences.
42. Darden (1991) makes the same point by also referring to the
CS litterature.
43. Carloye (1971, p. 566), for instance, distinguishes the roles of
models as providing revisualizations of the target domain and
as a basis for inference. He argues for intermingling them. See
also Swanson (1966). Margolis (1993) argues that cognitive
processes are acts of pattern-recognition, and apply this
perspective to the role played by analogies in the construction
of theories: “New theories emerge about what lies beyond what
we directly perceive, when we see the context as looking like
(roughly fitting) some pattern already in the repertoire. On the
argument here, analogy is not one route to discovery, it is the
only route” (MARGOLIS, 1993, p. 153). Indurkhya (1992) makes,
fundamentally, the same point.
44. I discussed their proposal elsewere (Abrantes, 1999) in more
details than I can do in the present paper.
45. Aranson et al. (1995) use resources from AI to implement the
notion of ‘type-hierarchy’ as a representation of one’s current
ontology. Conceptual schemata and nomic relationships are
associated with each type, which is represented as a node in a
tree. A major difference between Hesse’s and Aranson’s
accounts of material analogies is that the latter presuppose,
besides constraints imposed by the source representation, also
constraints imposed by an ontology (represented by a type-
hierarchy) where the source and the target representations are
embedded. Gardenfors’ “conceptual space” (1990, p. 83ff) plays
basically the same role as a type-hierarchy, by constraining which
predicates should be considered as “projectible” in inductions
and in analogical transfer of information: “Analogical and
metaphorical thinking is another way of establishing the
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similarity of objects. An analysis of these faculties in terms of
conceptual spaces may also be helpful in explaining how
inductive inferences can transfer information from one domain
of qualities to another” (GARDENFORS, 1990, p. 91).
46. Another example: the predicate “electric displacement” was
applied, before Maxwell, just to metals (or, more generally, to
matter) and Maxwell managed to apply it also to the ether (or,
more, generally, to the space that separates bunches of material
conductors). The “displacement of electricity” in the ether was
not like the unbounded displacement of electricity in material
conductors, though. One crucial question was: are magnetic
effects generated by the displacement of “electricity” in a
conductor (metal) also generated by the “electricity” displaced
in the ether? Maxwell bet on this hypothesis but he, at first,
had no empirical evidence for it. The consequences were,
however, dazzling: the finite speed of electromagnetic effects in
the ether and, ultimately, the identification of those
electromagnetic “waves” with the propagation of light. For
details, see Abrantes (1998a).
Hesse refers to this example in her 1976, p. 8. See also her
discussion of the application of the predicate ‘hard’ in
Eddington’s “two tables” (1980, p. 106-107). Harre and Gillet
(1994) give the example of an abstraction to the type “Newtonian
material objects and their modes of interaction”, which is
instantiated both in macroscopic objects and in molecules in
order to construct a kinetic theory of gases.
47. See also Hesse (1988, p. 336-337).
48. Cf. Black’s “interaction view of metaphor” (BLACK, 1962; 1979).
This view is discussed by Boyd (1979) and Indurkhya (1992).
49. Hesse gives the example of the change in meaning of the
predicate ‘charge’ in her 1980, p. 91-92, in the context of what
she calls “the network model of theoretical science”.
50. See Nickles (1987b).
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51. I think this was the main motivation behind Hesse’s early
attempts of explicating modeling as a kind of analogical
inference.
52. Helman (1988) provides a broad overview of the importance of
analogical reasoning in AI and in CS. See also Vosniadou (1989).
53. I am grateful to the Brazilian Research Council (CNPq) for a
grant that made possible this research.
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